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█ Abstract In recent years, philosophy has witnessed the birth and development of a new research pro-
gram that has provoked both enthusiasm and strong criticism: Experimental Philosophy (or X-Phi).  In 
this contribution, I will briefly examine the new field of experimental philosophy, its purposes and meth-
odologies. I will then summarize some of the objections that have been raised against this research pro-
gram, and the arguments with which experimental philosophers have used to counter these objections 
pointing to the usefulness of their studies for philosophy in general. I will then focus on a specific subject 
that has drawn the attention of experimental philosophers: the problem of free will, its compatibility with 
determinism, and the related issue of the role of intentionality in action generation. Free will is one of the 
most ancient and debated problems in philosophy, and also one of the issues on which experimental phi-
losophy methods can be most fruitfully applied, the concepts of free will and of moral responsibility being 
pervasive in everyday life and grounded in common sense. 
KEYWORDS: Free Will; Determinism; Experimental Philosophy; Folk Intuitions; Lay-theories. 
 
█ Riassunto Vivere un’illusione? Le intuizioni di senso comune sul libero arbitrio – Recentemente la filoso-
fia ha vissuto nascita e sviluppo di un nuovo programma di ricerca che ha suscitato entusiasmo e forti cri-
tiche: la filosofia sperimentale. In questa sede intendo illustrare la filosofia sperimentale, le sue finalità e i 
suoi metodi. Cercherò poi di riassumere alcune delle obiezioni sollevate contro questo programma di ri-
cerca e gli argomenti dei filosofi sperimentali per replicare alle critiche e sottolineare l’utilità dei loro studi 
per la filosofia in generale. Mi concentrerò poi su un particolare tema che è all’attenzione dei filosofi spe-
rimentali: la questione del libero arbitrio, la sua compatibilità con il determinismo e il ruolo 
dell’intenzionalità nella genesi dell’azione. Il libero arbitrio è uno dei più antichi e dibattuti problemi della 
filosofia e anche una delle questioni cui meglio si possono applicare i metodi della filosofia sperimentale, 
poiché libero arbitrio e responsabilità morale, concetto a esso collegato, sono molto presenti nella vita 
quotidiana ed estremamente radicati nel senso comune. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Libero arbitrio; Determinismo; Filosofia sperimentale; Intuizioni di senso comune; Teo-
rie di senso comune. 
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█ Experiments in philosophy 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OFTEN RE-
VEALS CONFLICTING intuitions about given 
issues. We seem to have good reasons to sup-
port a thesis, but also other equally strong 
reasons to sustain the opposite. 
When facing such complex situations, 
philosophers have a long-standing tradition 
of resorting to thought experiments: they 
build imaginary scenarios expressly designed 
to elicit intuitions about a certain philosoph-
ical concept or issue, in order to use them as 
evidence in support of their hypothesis, or to 
undermine hypotheses which they take to be 
inadequate. The history of philosophy is full 
of famous thought experiments: Plato’s alle-
gory of the cave, the Cartesian evil genius, 
Searle’s Chinese room, Chalmers’ zombies, 
Putnam’s brain in a vat, to name but a few. 
Dennett1 has referred to them as “intuition 
pumps” – not without a hint of irony, with 
regard to some cases –, for these thought ex-
periments can be very helpful in reasoning on 
philosophical problems or in understanding 
complex concepts, by transposing them in 
specific, exemplary cases. 
There is, however, a potential problem 
with such a strategy: when philosophers re-
flect on a thought experiment, they often 
tend to consider their own intuitions as rep-
resentative of common intuitions.2 That is, 
they regard their intuitions as psychological 
universals, shared by the majority of people 
capable of correctly understanding the imag-
inary situation described in a thought exper-
iment. Following Jackson,3 many philoso-
phers assume that their intuitions can reflect 
the ordinary conception to the extent to 
which they are allowed to consider them-
selves “typical”. 
However, claims about supposed “com-
mon intuitions” could indeed be unwarrant-
ed. In recent years, this worry has been one of 
the major impulses for the birth of experi-
mental philosophy, a research program that 
includes several different areas of research 
with the common objective of field-testing 
folk intuitions and lay-theories about philo-
sophical issues. Experimental philosophers 
(e.g., Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, Thomas 
Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias), subject peo-
ple’s intuitions on traditional philosophical 
issues such as consciousness, action, inten-
tionality, or morality, to empirical testing, 
using tools that are typical of empirical re-
search: scenarios, surveys, statistical analysis. 
To those who may ask: “Where does the 
difference lie with social psychology?”, an ex-
perimental philosopher will readily answer 
that there must not be any rigid dividing line 
between psychology and philosophy. Instead, 
the aim is to combine the tools of both the 
disciplines to develop interdisciplinary ap-
proaches to problems which are of both phil-
osophical and psychological interest. Exper-
imental philosophy studies are often co-
authored by philosophers and psychologists, 
and published in philosophy as well as in psy-
chology journals. 
In their critique of the armchair philoso-
phers’ use of (what they consider to be) folk 
intuitions to sustain their theses, experi-
mental philosophers hold that, in order to 
figure out what people find intuitive, the only 
legitimate way is to go and ask them. Other-
wise, philosophers may often consider what-
ever their students or they themselves hap-
pen to find intuitive as “folk belief”, with no 
guarantee of generality.  
Experiments conducted so far in the field 
of experimental philosophy have shown that 
philosophers have often been wrong in their 
claims about how people think about given 
philosophically relevant problems – both be-
cause laymen may have different intuitions 
from experts (i.e., philosophers), and because 
laypersons may have different intuitions 
concerning a given issue, due to a variety of 
factors (e.g., culture, gender, social pres-
sures). 
A typical experimental philosophy study 
will provide subjects with the description of 
particular scenarios especially designed for 
eliciting certain lines of thought, and will 
then ask participants questions that can be 
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reasonably taken to be indicative of, or ex-
press, their relevant intuitions on the given 
philosophical issue. This is often achieved by 
assessing and measuring the differences on 
people’s intuitions that result from small 
changes either in the description of the sce-
nario or in the way of putting the question. 
The results of the studies are analyzed statis-
tically, and the differences in people’s inclina-
tions are explained in terms of psychological 
processes. 
In a well-known study on intentionality in 
action,4 Joshua Knobe developed two ver-
sions of the same scenario representing the 
same actor doing the same action (a chair-
man deliberately trying to raise the profits 
for his company): in one version, the action 
had a positive side effect (improving the en-
vironment); in another version, it had a nega-
tive side effect (harming the environment). 
In both cases, the chairman was said not to 
care about whether the consequences of his 
actions were positive or negative. When 
asked about the intentionality of the effects 
on the environment, people showed two rad-
ically different patterns of response: in the 
harm condition, most of them (82%) said 
that the chairman brought about the side ef-
fect intentionally, whereas in the help condi-
tion only 23% of the subjects attributed in-
tentionality to the positive side effect. 
Also, the attribution of blame in the harm 
condition was significantly greater than the 
attribution of praise in the help condition. 
Since the side effect was the only element 
varying between the two scenarios, it very 
likely corresponds to the source of the dis-
crepancy between intuitions. This phenome-
non is known (even if not accepted without 
reserve) as the side-effect effect: when people 
have to attribute intentionality to the side 
effects of an agent’s action, they tend to be 
influenced by the moral quality of the out-
come in question.5 
 
█ Experimental philosophy on free will 
 
Let us now examine more closely one of 
the issues which experimental philosophy has 
dealt with the most: free will, a concept that 
is both controversial and grounded in our 
common-sense.6 The problem of free will 
arises from two contrasting and yet deeply-
rooted human beliefs: on the one hand, it 
seems natural to us that when we make deci-
sions about alternative future behavior, we 
can typically decide either way, only if we 
want to. 
Our acts follow our decisions coherently, 
and then we perceive those decisions as the 
main, if not the only cause of our behavior. 
On the other hand, it seems equally intuitive 
to us that every occurring event can be fully 
explained, or is entirely caused, by the causal 
chain of the past events that led to it. This 
second idea corresponds roughly to the phil-
osophical concept of determinism,7 and even 
if it is an intuitively attractive idea and a 
largely accepted position in science, it clashes 
with the first intuition that it is possible for 
us, given the same past conditions, to choose 
one way or the other. Hence it seems that we 
have to opt for one of these two intuitions: 
either we reject determinism and preserve 
free will, or we endorse determinism and 
acknowledge free will as an illusion. 
 
█ The causal role of intentions 
 
The problem of free will can be hard or 
maybe even impossible to solve, for two main 
reasons. The first is that the existence of free 
will depends largely on our own ideas of it. 
Free will has been variously described as 
freedom from internal or external con-
straints,8 as the ability to choose between al-
ternative possibilities or to do otherwise,9  as 
ultimate responsibility,10 as freedom to act on 
the basis of our beliefs and desires.11 These 
concepts have been used in different ways to 
support or reject the thesis that we possess a 
free will. 
The second problem is that even if we 
came to an agreement about the true nature 
of free will, which is unlikely to happen, it is 
doubtful that we could prove or disprove its 
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existence. Let us suppose, for the sake of ar-
gument, that we convene on the classical and 
widely accepted view of free will that the 
condition for us to be free is that we can act 
on the basis of our intentions and desires. 
In this view, we are only free if our (con-
scious) intentions and desires can cause, or at 
least have a role in causing, our behavior, 
even if we assume desires to be determined. 
However, if action arises (only) from internal 
or external factors that are out of our control, 
then we cannot consider ourselves free. That 
is why so many scientists have deemed 
Libet’s experiments on the timing of con-
scious will12 suitable to sanction the death of 
free will (most notably, Daniel Wegner).13 By 
showing that the awareness of one’s inten-
tion to move a finger arrives after the mo-
ment of the onset of the unconscious cerebral 
activity that leads to motor action, Libet’s 
experiment proves that 
 
the brain “decides” to initiate or, at least, 
to prepare to initiate the act before there 
is any reportable subjective awareness 
that such a decision has taken place.14 
 
Then, our will can just be an illusion, not a 
cause of action but merely a «personal con-
scious feeling of such causing, forcing, or mo-
toring».15 But the causal inefficacy of con-
scious intentions may be hard to prove: in 
fact, many have claimed that Libet’s experi-
ment only partially succeeded in accomplish-
ing its task.  
I intend to focus on a particular line 
of criticism16 that is based on a well-known 
distinction in the literature: the distinction 
between proximal and distal intentions. This 
argument states that Libet’s experiment does 
not supply a valid proof against the possibil-
ity of a causal role of conscious intentions, as 
it only shows the inefficacy of intentions 
formed immediately prior to a motor behav-
ior, that is, of proximal intentions. But Libet’s 
experiment does not tell us anything about 
the role, if any, of distal intentions, that is, of 
intentions built far in advance of action. This 
issue is particularly significant, especially in 
relation to our phenomenology of intentional 
action, since planning behavior and making 
general arrangements for the future is the 
most intuitive way in which we believe that 
conscious intentions can cause our behavior. 
Following this line of criticism, the problem 
of proving the existence or inexistence of free 
will boils down to proving the efficacy or in-
efficacy of conscious distal intentions. 
In order to investigate people’s per-
ception of the role of consciousness in action 
generation, myself and Paglieri17 conducted a 
study that surveyed folk intuitions about 
proximal and distal intentions using the 
methods of experimental philosophy. Our 
hypothesis was that the early planning of in-
tentions to act plays a fundamental role in 
determining ordinary intuitions about volun-
tary action. To test this hypothesis, we sub-
mitted different scenarios to participants de-
scribing actions where the two stages of dis-
tal and proximal formation of intentions 
were manipulated to appear either freely 
willed or rather externally and unconsciously 
determined. We found that the conscious vs. 
unconscious nature of intentions affected in-
tentionality and responsibility attributions at 
both stages of action preparation, but the ef-
fect was significantly more marked for distal 
intentions than for proximal ones, thereby 
confirming the centrality of long-term plan-
ning in folk intuitions of intentionality. 
Even for those who do not consider em-
pirical data to be binding for philosophical 
theories, these results highlight a general 
point on the role of folk intuitions in philos-
ophy. Claiming that a certain mental phe-
nomenon, e.g. free will, is an illusion requires 
proving that people do not exhibit that par-
ticular trait in the way they think they do: 
this in turn demands an empirical grasp on 
folk intuitions regarding that phenomenon. 
In this case, if philosophers want to prove the 
illusory nature of free will, they must provide 
a theory (and, for empirically informed phi-
losophers, also an empirical proof) of the in-
efficacy of distal intentions. 
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█ Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism 
 
Experimental philosophy studies have 
provided evidence for the claim that most 
people tend to reject the idea that our uni-
verse is deterministic.18 More precisely, they 
accept determinism when it is related to in-
animate objects, but are not prone to do the 
same when it comes to agents, even at an ear-
ly age.19 
But what do people think about the rela-
tionship between free will and determinism? 
Assuming that people were to accept the 
truth of determinism, how would their belief 
in free will be affected? Those who feel the 
need to choose between these two positions 
are known as incompatibilists, incompatibil-
ism being the thesis for which free will and 
determinism cannot be coherently accepted 
simultaneously. Compatibilists, on the other 
hand, claim that we could live in a determin-
istic universe and yet retain, in some mean-
ingful way, our free will. 
Several philosophers have claimed that 
most people, when faced with this problem 
for the first time, are inclined to be incom-
patibilists. Incompatibilist philosophers who 
defend this position claim that their view is 
commonsensical, while compatibilism is 
counter-intuitive. For example, Kane affirms 
that 
 
most ordinary persons start out as natural 
incompatibilists. They believe there is 
some kind of conflict between freedom 
and determinism […] Ordinary persons 
have to be talked out of this natural in-
compatibilism by the clever arguments of 
philosophers – who are only too happy to 
oblige.20 
 
Strawson writes that the libertarian form 
of incompatibilism, although impossible to 
sustain, is the spontaneous belief of common 
people who believe that things happen be-
cause of preceding causes, but also that we 
are irreducibly free and able to do otherwise, 
given the same conditions.21 
On the other hand, compatibilists have al-
so appealed to commonsense intuitions, 
claiming that people do not necessarily think 
about freedom in terms of the possibility of 
doing otherwise, as libertarians do. Frank-
furt-style cases22 are especially designed to 
bring out the intuition that we can be free 
even if we are not able to act differently than 
we do, that is, simply acting according to our 
fully determined intentions and desires. Since 
compatibilists and incompatibilists cannot 
both be right in claiming that their theories 
match the pre-philosophical intuitions of the 
majority of people, there is of course a need 
to systematically test what is really the intui-
tive position on the issue, if any at all. 
One of experimental philosophers’ pre-
ferred ways to do this is presenting people 
with specific cases of deterministic scenarios 
and checking whether they consider freedom 
or responsibility as possible in those situa-
tions. To ensure that the observed intuitions 
are genuinely “folk”, as opposed to philo-
sophically informed, this type of survey must 
target people who lack specific knowledge of 
the relevant philosophical arguments about 
free will, determinism and moral responsibil-
ity. 
Negative responses on the possibility of 
freedom and responsibility23 in a determinis-
tic scenario would indicate that subjects per-
ceive a conflict between them, and thus con-
sider determinism and freedom of will as in-
compatible, whereas positive responses 
would indicate a compatibilist position. Ma-
nipulating the scenarios and the questions 
addressed to the respondents could allow ex-
perimenters to identify the psychological fac-
tors that affect people’s intuitions. 
In a study by Nahmias and colleagues,24 
participants read about a deterministic sce-
nario in which a supercomputer can predict 
future events on the basis of its knowledge of 
the past and all the laws of nature. The su-
percomputer then predicts that at a certain 
time a man named Jeremy will rob a bank. 
The prediction turns out to be correct, and 
Jeremy indeed robs the bank at the time indi-
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cated by the supercomputer. Participants 
then were asked to judge whether Jeremy was 
morally blameworthy for what he had done: 
76% of them said that he was. 
To ensure that this result was not influ-
enced by the negative moral valence of the 
action in question – that is, by the fact that 
we might be more inclined to assign respon-
sibility to agents that are taken to be blame-
worthy – Nahmias and colleagues repeated 
the same test with a positive action (saving a 
child from a burning building) and with a 
neutral action (going jogging). In both cases, 
responses were similar to the first test: 68% 
of participants said Jeremy saved the child of 
his own free will, and 79% said he went jog-
ging of his own free will. 
Data from this study thus suggest that 
most ordinary people do not find incompati-
bilism intuitive or correct, and this, in the au-
thors’ opinion, undermines the claim that in-
compatibilism is the “natural” way of think-
ing about determinism and free will. 
These results might yet be challenged in 
two regards: first, laypeople may be confused 
by the technical description of the determin-
istic reality, described by expressions such as 
“laws of nature” and “current state of the 
universe”. Second, determinism is here de-
picted as predictability, which many philoso-
phers do not consider to be as threatening to 
free action as, for example, causation is. 
To solve these problems, Nichols and 
Knobe25 conducted a similar study by build-
ing a scenario in which determinism was de-
scribed as causal inevitability, in simple and 
non-technical terms. Their hypothesis was 
that most people really do have an incompat-
ibilist position about determinism and free 
action, but that this position reveals itself on-
ly in hypothetical and theoretical reasoning. 
However, when faced with real, concrete ac-
tions, people let their affective reactions 
drive their judgments. In the experiment, 
each participant was given the description of 
a deterministic and an indeterministic uni-
verse (Universes A and B).  
In Universe A, everything that happens is 
completely caused by what happened before, 
including agents’ decisions, from the begin-
ning of time until present day. In Universe B, 
causation involves everything except human 
decisions, that are free and do not have to 
happen. Subjects were first asked whether 
they thought our own universe was more 
similar to Universe A or B: nearly all of them 
(over 90%) answered that the second uni-
verse was most like ours.  
In the second question of the survey, par-
ticipants were assigned either a concrete or 
an abstract condition. In the concrete condi-
tion, they were told that in Universe A lives a 
man who has killed his whole family in order 
to have a relationship with his secretary. Sub-
jects were asked to say if this man is respon-
sible for his actions: 72% of the respondents 
gave the compatibilist answer, saying that the 
man is fully morally responsible for his acts. 
In the abstract condition, the survey only 
asked whether it was possible for a person to 
be fully morally responsible for their actions 
in Universe A. In this condition, 86% of the 
subjects answered in the negative, thus en-
dorsing an incompatibilist position. 
According to the authors, this study indi-
cates that one of the factors influencing peo-
ple’s contrasting intuitions on free will and 
determinism could be the abstract or con-
crete nature of the question, and the related 
level of emotion aroused by the story. Ab-
stract problems trigger theoretical, “scien-
tific” reasoning that drives people to draw 
the conclusion that determinism is incompat-
ible with freedom and responsibility. On the 
other hand, real situations, especially when 
emotionally laden, lead us to assign praise 
and blame to actions, and then responsibility 
and freedom of action to the agents. 
But why is this so? What are the psycho-
logical mechanisms underlying such discrep-
ancy in judgments? 
Nichols and Knobe identify two possible 
explanations that could account for the ex-
perimental data. The first is that strong af-
fective reactions can cause a bias in people’s 
judgments of morality and responsibility. In 
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this case, people do have a tacit theory of 
morality, and they can apply its criteria effi-
ciently in ordinary situations; but when 
strong violations of the moral norms that 
people implicitly accept are at stake, the re-
sulting involuntary emotional reaction pre-
vents them from using this resource. Affec-
tive activation is considered here as a dis-
turbance in the correct reasoning for the at-
tribution of responsibility. 
Another possible explanation is that af-
fect is not just a source of bias, but it is also 
one of the essential elements at the basis of 
the process by which we attribute praise and 
blame. In this sense, the cold, “scientific” 
theories of morality are not involved in our 
everyday-life attributions of moral responsi-
bility. 
Further studies are needed to establish 
which of these two alternative approaches 
(or a third one yet to be proposed) better ex-
plains the evidence. This discussion, howev-
er, exemplifies a fundamental question raised 
by experimental philosophy: how should we 
regard the intuitions elicited by the strong, 
emotional cases? Should we consider them as 
biased judgments, not reflecting the actual 
beliefs of laypeople, or should we take them 
as indicators of the folk conception of free 
will? 
Researchers are divided on this point. 
Nichols and Knobe think that the intuitions 
in the high-affect cases are the result of a per-
formance error due to the interference of 
emotions: when not biased by emotions, 
people tend to be libertarian about human 
choice, as they think human choices must not 
be determined in order for human behavior 
to be free. Eddy Nahmias, however, pleads 
differently. 
 
█ Mechanical incompatibilism: Determinism 
vs. physicalism 
 
Nahmias claims that the pre-philo-
sophical position on free will and determin-
ism is more often compatibilist, and that per-
formance errors only occur when people mis-
takenly assume that determinism entails the 
inefficacy of the agents’ conscious delibera-
tions and intentions. Even if it may seem that 
people have incompatibilist intuitions, this is 
only because they systematically confuse de-
terminism with reductive mechanism (i.e., 
physicalism) – often because philosophers 
themselves conflate the two concepts in the 
first place.26  
While determinism only entails that the 
present state of a system is a consequence of 
its past states and of the laws of nature, re-
ductive mechanism does not leave room for 
mental explanations of behavior: when peo-
ple are led to think of humans as mecha-
nisms, they are no longer able to apply an in-
tentional stance to them, thus they cannot 
see their actions as fully intended and free. 
Nahmias and colleagues’ hypothesis is that 
the alleged intuitive incompatibilism is not a 
pure incompatibilism between free will and 
determinism, but only a mechanical incom-
patibilism between free will and physicalism. 
This is fully understandable given the intui-
tive nature of the conflict between a physical-
ist conception of the human brain and a 
mentalistic explanation of human behavior 
in terms of beliefs, desires and intentions. 
Since some of the descriptions of deter-
ministic scenarios in the surveys seem to sug-
gest that our behavior is caused by forces 
that bypass our conscious mental life, incom-
patibilist intuitions might just arise because 
people 
 
fear that certain reductionistic or mecha-
nistic descriptions of decision-making 
and action conflict with freedom and re-
sponsibility.27 
 
But, as Nahmias points out, determinism 
does not entail fatalism, coercion by natural 
forces, reductionism or epiphenomenalism. 
Determinism is not necessarily the thesis that 
our brain mechanisms cause everything we 
do, while our mental states are just phenom-
enological noise. And, on the other hand, 
mechanism still allows indeterminism, as 
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causality could be explained through the laws 
of quantum physics. Determinism and mech-
anism are thus two distinct metaphysical 
concepts. 
So, Nahmias’ hypothesis is that ordinary 
people’s apparent incompatibilism derives 
from the threat posed to free will by physical-
ism rather than by determinism, and arises 
when the descriptions of determinism erro-
neously suggest a bypassing of our conscious 
mental life by forces out of our control. De-
terminism per se, says Nahmias, does not 
constitute a threat for free will in the mind of 
people; but if people understand determin-
ism in terms of mechanical or reductionistic 
causation, then it is not surprising if they 
turn out to be incompatibilists. 
To test this hypothesis, Nahmias28 devel-
oped an experiment in which two different 
scenarios corresponding to two different 
concepts of determinism were handed out to 
subjects divided in two conditions. In the 
first scenario, a universe where human be-
havior was the result of psychological states 
of mind was described, while the other repre-
sented a universe where the causes of human 
behavior were mechanical events in the 
brain. Both scenarios were clearly and explic-
itly deterministic in their description, but on-
ly the second one was also physicalist. 
Participants in the two conditions were 
then asked whether they thought the agents 
living in the two universes (Ertans) could act 
of their own free will, and if they should be 
given credit or blame for their actions. Only 
few of the participants who read the neuro-
reductionistic deterministic scenario thought 
that Ertans acted of their own free will 
(18%), and only 19% said that they deserve 
credit or blame for their actions, while a vast 
majority of those who read the non-
reductionistic deterministic scenario judged 
Ertans to be free (72%), and attributed moral 
responsibility to them (77%). 
Nahmias considers these data as evidence 
that people do not always regard causal de-
terminism as a threat to freedom and respon-
sibility. Instead, what they do find threaten-
ing is physicalism, since it suggests that our 
behavior is caused by forces that bypass our 
conscious mental life. 
 
█ A new study on mechanical incompati-
bilism 
 
In a recent study I conducted together 
with Fabio Paglieri29 we tried to replicate 
Nahmias’ results on mechanical incompati-
bilism introducing some methodological 
modifications to his design, as part of a 
broader study on folk intuitions on inten-
tionality attributions. Here only our data on 
compatibilism vs. incompatibilism will be 
discussed. 
The research included a pilot study on 51 
subjects (23 females) recruited from a large 
metropolitan area, and a main study which 
included 200 participants recruited among 
the Roma Tre University students (135 fe-
males, with age between 16 and 66 years, 
mean: 22.19). The test included a first series 
of scenarios designed to prove intuitions on 
the role of conscious will in distal and proxi-
mal intentions; a questionnaire to assess the 
personal degree of impulsiveness (Italian ver-
sion of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, see 
Patton, Stanford and Barratt, 1995),30 and 
finally, a second series of scenarios to survey 
intuitions on mechanical incompatibilism. 
In this last task, we assessed participants’ 
intuitions on the relationship between de-
terminism and free will, in terms of compati-
bilism vs. incompatibilism in the two condi-
tions of deterministic vs. physicalist reality. 
We used the following double-universe sce-
narios, inspired by Nahmias’ experiment, 
with only minor modifications31 and trans-
lated in Italian: 
 
Imagine that there is a universe similar to 
ours, in which there are two planets, 
called Neuroearth and Psychoearth, that 
are similar to our Earth in many respects. 
On these planets, the landscape and life 
are very similar to ours, and there are ad-
vanced life forms (respectively, Neu-
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roearthlings and Psychoearthlings) who 
look, talk, and behave very much like we 
do. However, the science of these planets 
has advanced far beyond ours: on Neu-
roearth there is an advanced knowledge 
in the field of neuroscience, on Psy-
choearth in that of psychology. The two 
planets are very far apart, and their inhab-
itants have no contact with each other, 
nor are they aware of each other’s exist-
ence. 
 
On Neuroearth, neuroscientists have dis-
covered exactly how Neuroearthlings’ 
brain works. They have found that every 
single decision taken and action per-
formed by Neuroearthlings is completely 
caused by the particular chemical reac-
tions and neurological processes that oc-
cur in the brain at that time, and that the-
se chemical reactions and neurological 
processes in the brain are caused entirely 
by preceding events, including Neu-
roearthlings’ genetic heritage and the en-
vironment in which they have lived. So, 
every action performed by Neuroearth-
lings is completely caused by the particu-
lar chemical reactions and neurological 
processes that occur in their brain at that 
time, and these neural events are in turn 
caused by genetics and environment. 
 
On the other hand, on Psychoearth, psy-
chologists have discovered exactly how 
Psychoearthlings’ mind works. They have 
found that every single decision taken and 
action performed by Psychoearthlings is 
completely caused by the particular 
thoughts, desires and plans they have at 
the moment, and that these thoughts, de-
sires and plans are completely caused by 
earlier events, including Psychoearthlings’ 
genetic inheritance and the environment 
in which they have lived. So, every action 
performed by Psychoearthlings is com-
pletely caused by the particular thoughts, 
desires and plans they have at the mo-
ment, and these mental events are in turn 
caused by genetics and environment. 
 
While Nahmias presented different 
groups of participants with only one deter-
ministic scenario, either physically reduction-
istic or non-reductionistic (between-subjects 
design), we submitted both scenarios to our 
participants, and probed their intuitions on 
both of them, with a within-subjects design. 
Our purpose was to ensure the robustness of 
the original result: presenting both the physi-
cally reductionistic (Neuroearth) and simple 
deterministic (Psychoearth) version within 
the same scenario makes it clear that they are 
equally deterministic, and thus should reduce 
any tendency to answer differently to them, 
if what matters is determinism. If, on the 
other hand, as Nahmias argues, what matters 
is physicalism, then the difference noted in 
the original study should emerge also in our 
within-subjects design. 
Another methodological difference re-
garded how questions were formulated: in 
addition to the questions about free will and 
responsibility of Neuroearthlings and Psy-
choearthlings,32 our subjects were questioned 
on the plausibility of the scenarios – namely, 
they were asked whether they thought it 
would be possible for us to obtain the same 
complete knowledge of the mind or brain as 
described in the scenarios. 
Moreover, participants in our study re-
sponded on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging 
from “certainly not” to “absolutely yes”, plus 
“I don’t know”) instead of giving a yes/no/I 
don’t know answer as in Nahmias’ original 
study.33 This was done to test the original re-
sult in a more challenging version of the ex-
perimental design, that allow to prove the 
robustness of mechanical incompatibilism 
with graded judgments instead of discrete 
choices (intentional/unintentional, responsi-
ble/non-responsible). 
We tested 200 participants (mean age = 
22.19, N of females = 135) recruited in Rome 
among university students. Participants had 
no professional knowledge on philosophical 
issues of free will and determinism.34 Partici-
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pation in both studies was on a voluntary ba-
sis, and subjects did not receive any compen-
sation for taking part to the experiment. 
Testing took place in November and De-
cember 2013. Participants were tested right 
before class, while seated in medium sized 
groups within a large lecture room: the ex-
perimenter and the teacher made sure no 
communication went on during testing, and 
participants located next to each other al-
ways received different versions of the test 
with a different order of presentation of the 
scenarios, to minimize mutual influence. The 
order of presentation of the descriptions of 
Psychoearth and Neuroearth was counter-
balanced across subjects, to control for order-
ing effects. 
The results we obtained confirmed Nah-
mias’ thesis: participants’ judgments about 
free will and responsibility were significantly 
higher in the simple deterministic scenario 
rather than in the mechanical one (F (1, 199) 
= 58.03, p <.0001). There was a higher will-
ingness to ascribe free will and responsibility 
to Psychoearthlings (mean attributed free 
will: 3.47, mean attributed responsibility: 
3.62) than to Neuroearthlings (free will: 2.83, 
responsibility: 3.09) which indicates stronger 
compatibilist intuitions in the deterministic 
universe. Regarding the perceived plausibil-
ity of the scenarios, all participants consid-
ered the scenarios reasonably plausible 
(mean Neuroearth: 3.50, mean Psychoearth: 
3.46), but we found an effect of the partici-
pants’ gender: while female participants 
tended to consider the non-physicalist sce-
nario as more plausible than the physicalist 
scenario, males considered them to be equal-
ly plausible (F(1,197) = 5.75, MSE = 3.91, p 
= 0.0174). This suggests that – at least 
among our participants – females seem to be 
less prone to consider mental events as re-
ducible to brain events. 
Aside from confirming Nahmias’ result, 
this replication in fact also strengthened it: as 
mentioned, presenting both scenarios to all 
participants made the similarities between 
the descriptions entirely obvious. The fact 
that the effect survives even under these 
conditions speaks strongly in favor of its sig-
nificance. 
An interesting way of looking at data on 
folk intuitions like those provided by this 
study has been pointed out by Nahmias and 
colleagues:35 folk intuitions can be used to 
settle presumptive probative obligations – in 
other terms, which side of a philosophical 
dispute has to start providing evidence in its 
favor. As they put it, 
 
if a philosophical theory does turn out to 
be privileged by the endorsement of the 
folk, that would seem to position the bur-
den of proof on the shoulders of those 
who argue contrary to folk intuitions.36 
 
Whichever position turns out to be sup-
ported by the majority of people, would then 
enjoy “squatter’s rights”. This was exactly the 
point that both incompatibilists and compat-
ibilists tried to exploit in claiming their 
respective positions to be commonsensical – 
a dispute that only experimental philosophy 
can help to settle. 
 
█  What can experimental philosophy offer to 
philosophy? 
 
An observation often directed to experi-
mental philosophy is that ordinary people 
lack the epistemic background to express 
philosophically relevant views on philosophi-
cal topics. According to this expertise objec-
tion,37 even when it comes to common-sense 
concepts like those of free will or morality, 
philosophers can use those concepts with a 
level of precision and expertise that ordinary 
people cannot quite reach. For this reason, it 
seems obvious that philosophers should not 
be interested in folk intuitions about philo-
sophical issues. They can safely ignore them, 
in much the same way as physicists can safely 
ignore folk intuitions about physics.38 
But experimental philosophers do not 
claim that common people’s intuitions – 
even when clearly aligned towards a certain 
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position – should be considered as a defini-
tive proof or confutation of a philosophical 
theory. Even if it is true that one of the dif-
ferent projects of experimental philosophy39 
consists of the assessment of what people’s 
intuitions are, no experimental philosopher 
ever aimed to use such data for settling philo-
sophical disputes. To put it simply, truth – at 
least in philosophical matters – is not a mat-
ter of consensus. Instead, the experimental 
philosophy project comes in response to the 
need to verify philosophers’ claims about 
what is “ordinary belief”, “common intui-
tion” or “pre-philosophical theory”. If phi-
losophers want to appeal to the intuitiveness 
of a thesis as evidence in their theorizing, 
they should also want to be sure their own 
intuition about other people’s intuitions is 
correct.40 
Furthermore, experimental philosophers 
claim that even if surveying folk intuitions 
does not directly aim at challenging or con-
firming philosophical theories, certain philo-
sophical questions would not even exist 
without common sense intuitions. Consider, 
for example, the problem of moral responsi-
bility, that arises only because people, for a 
number of reasons that it is interesting to in-
vestigate, consider themselves and others as 
worthy of praise or blame for their behavior. 
In such a case, consulting folk intuitions can 
indeed be helpful for formulating philosoph-
ical theories that can match with our every-
day idea of what constitutes moral responsi-
bility. In other words, in certain domains in-
tuitions rightfully belong to the set of rele-
vant facts that an adequate philosophical 
theory has to account for. In those areas, ex-
perimental philosophy stands to armchair 
philosophy as fact checking stands to good 
journalism. 
Besides, there are at least two more rea-
sons why knowing laypeople’s ideas on philo-
sophical questions can be useful for philoso-
phy. First, folk intuitions are not influenced 
by an intense philosophical training and so 
may be more spontaneous than those of phi-
losophers. The problem is not that lack of 
spontaneity implies worse intuitions, but that 
philosophers themselves often present their 
own intuitions as being representative of 
laymen views on a certain philosophical is-
sue.41 Second, it is just when folk intuitions 
differ from those of philosophers that it be-
comes interesting in its own right to investi-
gate the relevant differences between the two 
ways of thinking, and to search for explana-
tions of them. 
Ultimately, the debate on the usefulness 
(or lack thereof) of experimental philosophy 
boils down to the role of intuitions in philo-
sophical analysis. If we want intuitions to do 
any heavy lifting in philosophical arguments, 
then we better make sure we get our facts 
straight, and experimental philosophy has 
the unquestionable merit of providing a 
method for discerning which claims about 
ordinary intuitions are well-founded and 
which are not.42 Sure, the hype about it may 
have gotten out of hand on some occasions – 
but also the criticisms raised against it were 
often excessive, as it is wont to happen when 
claims about “a new approach” are made. 
Granted, no substantial boundary is apparent 
between experimental philosophy and social 
psychology, but nor it is needed: in fact, ar-
guably a huge pay-off of experimental phi-
losophy is precisely to get social psychologists 
more interested in philosophical topics, and 
to bring more philosophical analysis into 
psychological papers – in short, a virtuous 
increase in true interdisciplinary collabora-
tion.  
An interesting interpretation of the de-
bate on experimental philosophy comes from 
Rose and Danks, who suggest that  
 
the major objections to the use of intui-
tions by experimental philosophers are ac-
tually expressions of antinaturalism, con-
cerns about the cognitive science, or 
both.43 
 
In their view, experimental philosophy, 
rather than being a brand new discipline, is a 
new instantiation of the ancient tradition of 
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philosophical naturalism. The only differ-
ence is that philosophers have started to 
conduct experiments by themselves, or in 
close collaboration with psychologists and 
social scientists, instead of just appealing to 
external empirical evidence. Thus, the use-
fulness of data coming from experimental 
philosophy’s studies depends solely on how 
empirical data are relevant to that particular 
philosophical issue. From this point of view, 
even those who are not willing to grant ex-
perimental philosophy the status of “new dis-
cipline” may acknowledge its contribution to 
an empirically informed philosophy. 
But experimental philosophy does not 
limit itself to surveying intuitions: another 
project of experimental philosophy aims to 
discover why people think the way they 
think, that is, what are the psychological 
mechanisms that produce a given intuition or 
folk theory. The increasing amount of data 
coming from experimental psychology about 
the many biases and prejudices involved in 
almost every judgment, decision or reasoning 
process should give pause to philosophers, 
since experts are certainly not immune to au-
tomatic processes and cognitive distortions. 
Armchair philosophers could indeed be 
prone to privileging theories that accord with 
their own intuitions: lacking proper empiri-
cal analysis of such intuitions, this tendency 
could be problematic, insofar as such intui-
tions largely depend on philosophically irrel-
evant factors. 
Indeed, folk intuitions can be the result of 
a large set of factors that form or influence 
our subjective idea of the world. Studying in 
depth what factors influence people’s judg-
ments is extremely important, so as to find 
out what leads us to have the intuitions we 
have. In their experimental philosophy mani-
festo,44 Knobe and Nichols claim that the 
first major goal of experimental philosophy is 
to rehabilitate a practice that has been aban-
doned for far too long: the pursuit of the un-
derlying sources of our beliefs. If, for exam-
ple, we were to find out that a certain intui-
tion is driven by a particular bias or emotion-
al condition, we then would know more 
about the cognitive mechanisms responsible 
for that intuition. 
Thus, experimental results on folk intui-
tions do not have to have a direct impact on 
the work of philosophers in order to be 
granted philosophical relevance. It is suffi-
cient that they can have a legitimate indirect 
impact in terms of being a guide to discover-
ing the underlying psychological processes 
that generate people’s intuitions. 
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